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Abstract 
The ability to correctly interpret data is an important skill in modern knowledge societies. The 
present study investigates adults’ ability to interpret covariation data presented in bar graphs. 
Drawing on previous findings that show that the problem context influences the interpretation 
of contingency tables (grounded and concrete problems are easier than abstract ones) and based 
on findings from the literature on motivated reasoning (confirming problems are easier than 
disconfirming ones), we present N = 111 undergraduates with bar graphs in either grounded 
(confirming or disconfirming) or abstract contexts. Our results show that only grounded 
problems in confirming contexts are easier than abstract ones; grounded problems in 
disconfirming contexts are more challenging than abstract ones. Overall, the interpretation of 
bar graphs is difficult: Even in our sample of educated college students, correct performance 
did not exceed 50%. Our results support earlier findings regarding the context dependency of 
data-interpretation skills, and they suggest that relatively minor task variations have an impact 
on reasoners’ interpretations of bar graphs. 
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1. Introduction 
Data interpretation is a key feature of scientific thinking, and it is an important skill—not only in 
schools, but also in everyday life, where people need to consider complex data when making far-reaching 
decisions (e.g., when making decisions in the context of elections, investments, or about medical treatments). 
Although basic abilities in data interpretation are already present in elementary school children (Koerber, 
Mayer, Osterhaus, Schwippert, & Sodian, 2015), even adults have difficulties to correctly interpret complex 
data about covariation (e.g., Saffran, Barchfeld, Sodian, & Alibali, 2016). For instance, when asked to interpret 
data presented in 2x2 contingency tables, reasoners frequently fail to use the correct strategy, which involves 
a comparison of the conditional probabilities across the rows. Often, reasoners use simpler strategies: they 
compare the absolute frequencies across two cells (compare-two strategy; Shaklee & Tucker, 1980) or they 
try to find an anchor in the data (a simple ratio between two cells, such as 1:1 or 2:1) to which they compare 
the ratio between the other two cells (anchor-and-compare strategy; Osterhaus, Magee, Saffran, & Alibali, 
2019). 
Previous work has shown that reasoners’ successful interpretations of contingency tables depend on 
two characteristics of the task, which are the symmetry of the problem (symmetric vs. asymmetric; Saffran et 
al., 2016)  and the problem context (grounded vs. abstract; Osterhaus et al., 2019). Symmetric problems involve 
a comparison between two candidate causes (i.e., X1 leads to Y, X2 leads to Y), whereas in asymmetric 
problems, a candidate cause is compared to a control group, to which no intervention is applied (X leads to Y, 
not-X leads to Y). Symmetric problems are easier, because they seem to equally draw reasoners’ attention to 
all four cells. Comparing grounded to abstract contingency problems, research has shown that grounded 
problems (i.e., problems involving a concrete context and cover story) are easier, because they seem to afford 
a quicker access to long-term memory and the easier access of pragmatic cognitive schemas that might support 
reasoning (Osterhaus et al., 2019). 
Contingency tables are an effective way to present data regarding the relation between two 
dichotomous variables. They are, however, not the most common form of data presentation that people 
encounter in their daily lives. More frequent are visualizations, such as bar graphs, which people are presented 
with far more often, for instance in the media. Bar graphs facilitate information processing by presenting 
covariation data in a spatial organization that allows reasoners to quickly grasp the relation between two 
variables, and also, they allow to outsource cognitive processes to an additional perceptual route (Hegarty, 
2011). 
Research shows that already young kindergarten and elementary school children can read off 
information about relations from graphs, resulting in an update of existing beliefs in response to the data 
(Koerber, Osterhaus, & Sodian, 2017). Although bar graphs are a common and effective way of presenting 
data, adults’ ability to interpret this form of data presentation is not well understood, and it is unclear if task 
variations (like the ones observed in the study of contingency tables) have a similar impact on people’s 
interpretation and strategy choice on these problems. 
The present study, therefore, investigates adults’ ability to interpret data that is presented in bar graphs. 
Following earlier findings regarding the influence of context on the interpretation of contingency tables 
(Osterhaus et al., 2018), we present participants with bar graphs that are embedded in either a grounded or 
abstract context, and that can only be solved correctly by using the conditional-probabilities strategy 
(comparing conditional probabilities across conditions). 
Based on prior findings from the study of contingency tables (Osterhaus et al., 2019), we hypothesized 
that grounded problems afford correct interpretations relative to abstract ones. Drawing on the literature on 
reasoning biases in data interpretation (Chinn & Brewer, 1993) and on motivated reasoning (Klaczynski, 
2001), our study also explores if the beneficial effect of grounded problems is stable across confirming and 
disconfirming contexts. It is reasonable to assume that grounded problems are only easier when they are 
confirming, that is, when they lead to an activation of prior knowledge that is in line with the data presented. 
Research has shown that people are less likely to take seriously an implausible covariation between two factors 
when there is no plausible causal explanation (Koslowski, 1996), and so we expect disconfirming contexts to 
be, in turn, more difficult. Disconfirming contexts present reasoners with causal relations that seem implausible 
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given their prior knowledge, which may result in a distortion, rather than an affordance, of their correct 
interpretation. 
2. Methods 
2.1 Participants 
The sample comprised 111 university students who were (in majority) recruited from two large German 
research universities (N = 111; 91 females, 19 males; 1 participant did not disclose their gender). Informed 
consent was obtained from all participants. Participants were recruited via social media and through advertising 
in the universities. Participants received either course credit for their participation or they entered a lottery to 
win a voucher for a bookstore. 
2.2 Design 
We used a within-subjects design with three groups (confirming vs. disconfirming vs. abstract context) 
in which participants interpreted a set of 3 x 3 (9) bar graphs. A post-hoc power analysis conducted with 
G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) showed a power of 1-β = 1.00 (α = 0.05, effect size f = 
0.71). 
2.3 Materials 
We used three different bar graphs for each of the three conditions (confirming vs. disconfirming vs. 
abstract contexts). All problems were presented in the asymmetric form to provide the highest difficulty level. 
The frequencies displayed in the bar graphs were taken from a prior study with contingency tables (Saffran et 
al., 2016; see Table 1). We only included cell frequencies that resulted in problems that could exclusively be 
solved by using the conditional-probabilities strategy (but not any other less sophisticated strategy). This way, 
participants’ correct solutions are indicative of their use of the conditional-probabilities strategy, which is the 
only strategy that guarantees the correct interpretation independently of the exact cell frequencies. The 
problems should, therefore, be of comparable difficulty—especially because we chose cell frequencies < 1,000 
in order to keep computing demands at an acceptable level. 
The bar graphs were designed in Microsoft® Excel (for an example, see Figure 1) and they were 
presented in an online questionnaire. For every bar graph, participants were asked to decide (based on the data 
presented) if a given intervention (present, absent) has a positive, negative, or no effect at all on a given 
dichotomous outcome variable (effect present, absent). For the confirming problems, participants interpreted 
data that showed a positive relation between tutoring (in maths, physics, or chemistry) and grade improvement 
(i.e., the number of students whose grades did or did not improve); for the disconfirming problems, participants 
interpreted data that showed a negative or no relation between doing sports (jogging, cycling, or swimming) 
and the improvement of people’s fitness level (i.e., the number of people whose fitness level did or did not 
improve); and for the abstract problems, participants interpreted data that showed a positive, negative or no 
effect between an abstract candidate cause (X, Y, or Z) and an abstract outcome variable x (i.e., the number of 
instances where x is present or absent). The specific problem contexts in the grounded condition were chosen 
because we expected them to elicit equally strong expectations regarding the direction of the causal relation 
(e.g., tutoring improves grades, doing sports improves fitness level). 
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Table 1 
Overview of Frequencies Used in the Problems and Correct Solutions per Problem 
Condition / Variables Problem Correct Response M SD 
  + -     
Grounded: confirming / 
Tutoring – grade (maths) 
+ 11 30  Positive effect 0.68 0.47 
-  1 20  
  
+ 
 
- 
 
 
Grounded: confirming / 
Tutoring – grade (physics) 
+ 11 96  Positive effect 0.75 0.44 
- 1 87  
  
+ 
 
- 
 
Grounded: confirming / 
Tutoring – grade (chemistry) 
+ 32 91  Positive effect 0.52 0.50 
- 11 70  
  
+ 
 
- 
 
Abstract / 
X – outcome 
+ 38 56  No effect 0.39 0.49 
- 114 168  
  
+ 
 
- 
 
Abstract / 
Y – outcome 
+ 190 990  Positive effect 0.47 0.50 
- 130 930  
  
+ 
 
- 
 
Abstract / 
Z – outcome 
+ 8 46  Negative effect 0.64 0.48 
- 35 73  
  
+ 
 
- 
 
Grounded: disconfirming / 
Swimming – fit 
+ 454 299  Negative effect 0.33 0.47 
- 299 144  
  
+ 
 
- 
 
Grounded: disconfirming / 
Jogging – fit 
+ 20 10  No effect 0.35 0.48 
- 10 5  
  
+ 
 
- 
 
Grounded: disconfirming / 
Cycling – fit 
 
+ 450 150  Negative effect 0.11 0.31 
 
 
- 400 100  
    
Note. The contingency tables under ‘Problem’ display the treatment condition in the columns (treatment +/ no 
treatment -) and the outcome in the rows (improvement +/ no improvement -). 
2.4 Procedure 
Participants responded to the nine items in an online questionnaire (Social Science Survey). Confirming, 
disconfirming, and abstract problems were presented in a randomized order; this order was the same for all 
participants. There were no minimum or maximum time boundaries for inclusion in the study (only three 
participants took longer than one hour to click through the problems). For the remaining participants, the  
completion of the survey took on average 6.5 minutes (SD = 7.1). 
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2.5 Coding 
Participants were given 1 point per problem when they offered the correct interpretation of the data, and 
0 points when they did not. A sum score was calculated, so that participants could obtain between 0 and 3 
points for each of the three conditions. The correct response for each item was determined by comparing the 
conditional probabilities regardless of the size of the difference. If the two conditional probabilities for 
‘improved’ were equal and P (improved | Treatment) = P (improved | No Treatment), there was no effect. If 
P (improved | Treatment) > P (improved | No Treatment), there was a positive effect; if P (improved | 
Treatment) < P (improved | No Treatment), there was a ‘negative effect’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1. Example item (grounded, confirming context). 
3. Results 
3.1 Correct Solutions 
On average and across all conditions, participants provided correct solutions on 4.23 of the 9 problems 
(SD = 2.48, min = 0, max = 9). Performance differed substantially across items, ranging from 11% to 68% 
correct (see Table 1). 
3.2 Influence of Context: Confirming vs. Abstract vs. Disconfirming 
A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to test for the influence of context. 
The assumption of sphericity was met (Mauchly’s W = 0.951, p = 0.06). The data were not distributed 
normally, but the repeated-measures ANOVA tends to be robust against violations of the assumption of 
normality. The analysis revealed significant differences between the three conditions, F(2, 222) = 73.66, 
p < .001, η2 = 0.40. A planned contrast (problem context) indicated no significant difference between the 
grounded (confirming and disconfirming) and abstract problems, t(110) = -1.718, p = .96. A set of post-hoc 
tests, however, revealed significant differences between all three conditions: the confirming condition 
(M = 1.9, SD = 1.1) was significantly easier than the abstract condition (M = 1.5, SD = 0.9), t(110) = 5.11, 
p < .001, Cohen’s d = .48, which in turn was significantly easier than the disconfirming condition (M = 0.8, 
SD = 1.0), t(110) = 7.59, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .72 (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. The average amount of correct solutions (out of a maximum of 3) per condition (confirming vs. 
abstract vs. disconfirming contexts). Error bars display standard errors (SE). 
4. Discussion 
Bar graphs are a commonly-used visualization to present data about covariation. Despite their common 
use, the findings of the present study show that they are difficult to be correctly interpreted, even by educated 
undergraduate students. This is especially true when the data are presented in abstract or disconfirming 
contexts. 
The influences of problem context (grounded vs. abstract) have not previously been investigated in 
reasoners’ interpretation of bar graphs. Findings from the study of people’s interpretation of contingency tables 
suggest that grounded problems are easier than abstract ones because they may support reasoning by enabling 
a quicker access to long-term memory and the easier access of pragmatic cognitive schemas. The present study 
shows that indeed grounded problems lead to a higher number of correct responses. Extending on previous 
work, our results, however, show that this finding only holds when a confirming context is used (i.e., a context 
that presents participants with a causal relation that is plausible given their prior knowledge). When, in turn, a 
disconfirming context is used (i.e., a context that presents participants with a causal relation that is implausible 
given their prior knowledge), correct performance declines. 
The decline in performance for disconfirming contexts is in line with the literature on reasoning biases 
in scientific reasoning (Chinn & Brewer, 1993) and motivated reasoning (Klaczynski, 2000), and it suggests 
that participants are guided by their prior knowledge when solving problems like the ones presented in the 
current study. On all disconfirming problems, the use of a simple strategy (e.g., compare two) resulted in an 
interpretation that seemed plausible given participants’ prior knowledge. On the confirming problems, the use 
of the same simple strategy resulted in an interpretation that seemed implausible. It seems likely that 
participants generally used less sophisticated strategies first and did not invest further cognitive resources if 
their judgement was in line with their expectations based on prior knowledge. When, however, an initially not 
sophisticated interpretation resulted in an implausible, conflicting outcome, participants were likely inclined 
to pay more attention to the data and to explore various interpretations. Compared to abstract contexts, the use 
of grounded problems thus has a general impact on performance. Whether or not this influence is beneficial or 
detrimental, however, depends on the specific context that is used and its fit with participants’ prior knowledge. 
Correct performance was, in the present study, overall low: the undergraduate students in our sample 
solved only an average of 47% of the problems correctly. This percentage is higher than the chance of correct 
guessing and it is similar to undergraduate students’ interpretation of contingency tables, for which comparable 
numbers of correct solutions were found (e.g., 54% in Osterhaus et al., 2019). Although correct performance 
is difficult to compare across studies (in our study, only the conditional probabilities strategy led to correct 
responses; in other studies, some problems can be solved with simpler strategies), the present findings suggest 
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that the interpretation of bar graphs is, in contrast to popular belief, not substantially easier than the 
interpretation of data that is presented in contingency tables. 
A limitation of the present study is that the conditional probabilities were not equal across conditions. 
That is, in order to confirm or disconfirm participants’ prior beliefs, we used different causal directions and 
strengths across conditions. Future work should keep these probabilities constant to assure that they are not 
confounding factors that may potentially drive the effect. All of the items that we used in the present study, 
however, could only be solved with the conditional-probabilities strategy. Research has shown that reasoners’ 
use of this strategy is quite consistent across contingency tables with different conditional probabilities 
(Osterhaus et al., 2019), and so we do not expect the discrepancies in conditional probabilities to have caused 
the substantial differences in correct solutions (and strategy use) between the conditions. 
The difficulties in interpreting bar graphs that we documented in the present study are a finding that 
needs to be stressed. People are often presented with bar graphs (e.g., in the media, in patient brochures, in 
investment information, etc.), and overestimating reasoners’ ability to correctly interpret this information is 
likely to result in poor decision making. Future research should, therefore, address the question of how to foster 
this important ability, thereby increasing scientific literacy and helping people to draw correct inferences from 
diverse forms of data, including bar graphs. 
Keypoints 
 The correct interpretation of bar graphs is difficult, even for educated college students. 
 Relatively minor tasks variations have an impact on reasoners’ interpretation of the data. 
 Grounded problems in confirming contexts afford correct interpretations relative to abstract 
contexts. 
 Grounded problems in disconfirming contexts distort reasoners’ interpretations. 
Acknowledgments 
The research was conducted by Nina Knöchelmann, Sabine Krueger, and Anita Flack in the context 
of a BSc psychology seminar at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (LMU), under the direction of 
Christopher Osterhaus. The research was supported by a “teaching through research” grant provided by LMU 
(Forschungsförderung “Lehre@LMU”), awarded to Matthias Stadler and Christopher Osterhaus. We are 
grateful to all participants for their friendly collaboration and support of this research. 
References 
Chinn, C. A., & Brewer, W. F. (1993). The role of anomalous data in knowledge acquisition: A theoretical 
framework and implications for science instruction. Review of Educational Research, 63, 1-49. 
doi:10.3102/00346543063001001 
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A.-G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G*Power 3: A flexible statistical power analysis 
program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. Behavior Research Methods, 39, 175–
191. doi:10.3758/BRM.41.4.1149 
Hegarty, M. (2011). The cognitive science of visual-spatial displays: implications for design. Topics in 
Cognitive Science, 3(3), 446–474. doi:10.1111/j.1756-8765.2011.01150.x 
Klaczynski, P. A. (2000). Motivated scientific reasoning biases, epistemological beliefs, and theory 
polarization: a two-process approach to adolescent cognition. Child Development, 71, 1347–1366. 
doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00232 
Koerber, S., Osterhaus, C., & Sodian, B. (2017). Diagrams support belief revision. Frontline Learning 
Research, 5(1), 76–84. doi:10.14786/flr.v5i1.265 
Knöchelmann et al 
	
65 | F L R  
 
Koerber, S., Mayer, D., Osterhaus, C., Schwippert, K., & Sodian, B. (2015). The development of scientific 
thinking in elementary school: A comprehensive inventory. Child Development, 86, 327–336. 
doi:10.1111/cdev.12298 
Koslowski, B. (1996). Theory and evidence: The development of scientific reasoning. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.  
Osterhaus, C., Magee, J., Saffran, A., & Alibali, M. W. (2019). Supporting successful interpretations of 
covariation data: Beneficial effects of variable symmetry and problem context. Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 72, 994–1004. doi:10.1177/1747021818775909 
Saffran, A., Barchfeld, P., Sodian, B., & Alibali, M. W. (2016). Children’s and adults’ interpretation of 
covariation data: Does symmetry of variables matter? Developmental Psychology, 52, 1530–1544. 
doi:10.1037/dev0000203 
Shaklee, H., & Tucker, D. (1980). A rule analysis of judgments of covariation between events. Memory &  
bars display standard errors (SE). 
